شناسایی مخاطرات اخلاقی و انتخاب نامناسب در بیمه گندم آبی استان خراسان رضوی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

• ارش دوراندیش ¹
• سارا کارگر ²
• محمد قربانی ³

¹ دانشیار گروه اقتصاد کشاورزی، دانشکده کشاورزی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

² دانش آموخته کارشناسی ارشد گروه اقتصاد کشاورزی، دانشکده کشاورزی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران

³ استاد گروه اقتصاد کشاورزی، دانشکده کشاورزی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران

10.30495/jae.2023.25037.2171

چکیده

ریسک‌های اجتماعی پدیده خاص دیگری از ریسک‌های موجود در حوزه کشاورزی هستند. در تحقیق حاضر به منظور شناسایی مخاطرات اخلاقی و انتخاب نامناسب در بیمه گندم آبی در استان خراسان رضوی، از مدل سیستم معادلات همزمان استفاده گردید. نمونه با استفاده از نمونه‌گیری تناسبی 143 گندمکار بیمه شده و بیمه نشده در سال زراعی 1398-1397 در با اقلیم‌های سرد، معتدل سرد و معتدل گرم جمع‌آوری گردید. نتایج تحقیق بیانگر آن می‌باشد که بهره‌برداران بیمه شده در نواحی معتدل گرم و معتدل سرد، مصرف نهاده‌ها برای تولید در واحد سطح گندم را کاهش نداده‌اند که این مساله می‌تواند بیانگر عدم وجود مخاطره اخلاقی در این نواحی باشد. در مقابل نتایج بدست آمده از اقلیم سرد نشان می‌دهد که بهره برداران بیمه شده در این ناحیه، از مصرف نهاده‌های تولید کاسته‌اند که وجود مخاطره اخلاقی در این ناحیه را نشان می‌دهد. همچنین نتایج آزمون فرضیه بازده ثابت نسبت به مقیاس در مقابل فرضیه بازده افزایشی یا کاهشی نسبت به مقیاس برای نهاده‌های متغیر، عدم وجود انتخاب نامناسب را نشان می‌دهد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

• انتخاب نامناسب
• بیمه کشاورزی
• تابع تولید
• تابع تقاضا
• مخاطرات اخلاقی

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عنوان مقاله [English]

Identifying the Moral hazard and Adverse Selection in the Insurance of Irrigated Wheat Crop in Khorasan Razavi Province

نویسندگان [English]

• Arash Dourandish ¹
• Sara Kargar ²
• Mohammad Ghorbani ³

¹ Associate Prof, Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

² MSc, Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran

³ Prof, Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran

چکیده [English]

Social risks are another specific phenomenon in the agricultural sector. . In the present study, in order to identify ethical risks and adverse selection in Khorasan Razavi irrigated wheat insurance, a simultaneous equation system model . The sample size was determined by proportional sampling Collected. The results indicate that insured farming in warm-temperate and cold-temperate regions have not reduced inputs for production per unit area of wheat, indicating a lack of ethical risk in these areas. In contrast, the results from the cold zone show that the insured beneficiaries has reduced the consumption of inputs in the area, indicating a moral hazard in this area. Also, the results of the test of the hypothesis of constant returns to scale versus the decreasing or increasing return hypothesis for variable inputs show the absence of adverse selection. Therefore, it is suggested that appropriate training and extension classes be held for farmers in order to better understand the time and manner of using chemical fertilizers and the appropriate time for irrigation.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

• Agricultural Insurance
• Adverse Selection
• Demand Function
• Production Function
• Moral hazard

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